Customer Orientation, Social Values And Reward

System On Performance Of Life Insurance Agents by Hon Tat, Muhahuam
CUSTOIVIER ORIENTATION, SOCIAL VALUES AND REWARD 
SYSTEM ON PERFORMANCE OF LIFE INSURANCE AGENTS 
, .. 
by 
HUAMHONTAT 
Research report submitted iri partial fulfillment of the requirement for the 
degree of Master of Business Administration 
May 1999 
DEDICATION 
Specially dedicated to my late grandfather; 
. My mother and father; 
My wife- New Pek Sian & 
Our daughter - ChtWI Faye 
ACKNO\VLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my thanks to my supervisor. Dr. Roselina Ahmad Saufi and 
my co-supervisor, Prof. Madya Dr. Muhamad Jantan for their valuable guidance and 
assistance throughout this research. 
To my insurance associates who have helped me in the distribution and collection of 
the questionnaires. Finally, my sincere thank~-~ all the lecturers _and coursemates at 
USM for being so helpful throughout my study. To all of you who had helped me in 
one way or another, thank you again. 
111 
CONTENTS 
TITLE 
DEDICATION 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
CONTENTS 
.,0 
LIST OF TABLES 
LIST OF FIGURES 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
ABSTRAK 
ABSTRACT 
Chapter I: r\TRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Research Problem 
1 . .2 Research Objectives 
1.3 Significance of Study 
1 A Research Scope 
Chapter 2: LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY & PROFIL~ OF AlA 
2.0 Historical Background of Insurance Business in 
Malaysia 
2.1 An Overview of the Insurance Industry 
2.2 Principal-Agent Relationship 
2.3 Insurance Legislation 
2.3.1 The Insurance Act 1996 
2.3.2 Section 44A and Section 16A 
2.4 Compensation of Life Insurance Agents 
? -__ ) Profile of AlA 
2.5.1 A Brief History of AlA 
7 - 7 
_.J._ Background of AlA }4alaysia 
') -., 
_.) . .) AlA Agency lvfanagement 
~.5.-1 The Role of An AlA Life Insurance Agent 
, - - T}pe of Reward in A/A ' ) ' 
-·-../·-' 
IV 
Page 
11 
111 
IV 
vii 
Vlll 
IX 
X 
XI 
2 
5 
5 
6 
7 
7 
8 
9 
11 
11 
II 
13 
15 
I5 
I6 
17 
18 
18 
Chapter 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.0 Introduction 
3.1 Individual Job Performance 
3.1.1 Definition of Individual Job Pe1jormance 
3.1.1 Dimemions of Individual Job Pe1jormance 
3.2 Factors Influencing Individual Job Pe1formance 
3.2. I Introduction 
3.2.1 Customer-Oriented Selling Behavior 
3.2.3 Social Values 
3.2.4 Incentive and Reward 
3.2.5 Demographic Characteristics 
3.1.6 Organizational Climate .. 
3.2.7 Motivation 
3.2.8 'Adaptive Selling Behavior 
3.2.9 Role-Modeling Behavior 
3.2.10 Quota Setting 
3.2.1 1 Role Clarity 
3.2. 11 Ethical Behavior 
3.2.13 Training and Development 
3.2./.f. Job Image 
3.2./5 Pe1jormance Congruence 
3.1.16 Others 
.., ., Summary .) . .) 
Chapter 4: RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
4.0 Introduction 
4.1 Research Framework 
4.2 Definition of Variables 
-1.2.1 Customer-Orien·ted Selling Behavior 
-1.2.2 Social Values 
4.2.3 Type of Reward 
4.2.4 Job Performance 
4.3 Development of Hypotheses 
4.4 Research Design 
.:J.4.1 Type of Study 
.. 4.4.2 Nature ofStudy .--
.:J.4.3 Study Setting 
t .. 
4.4.4 Unit of Analysis .• 
~" 4.4.5 Population and Sample 
4.5 Administration of Questionnaire 
4.6 Data Collection Method 
4.7 Data Analysis 
Chapter 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
5.0 Introduction 
5.1 Sample Characteristics 
5.2 Reliability of Measures 
\' 
21 
21 
21 
21 
23 
26 
26 
27 
29 
32 
35 
36 . 
36 
37 
38 
38 
39 
39 
40 
40 
41 
41 
42 
44 
44 
44 
45 
45 
46 
46 
47 
47 
48 
48 
49 
49 
49 
49 
50 
51 
51 
55 
55 
55 
56 
5.3 Testing of Hypotheses 58 
Chapter 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 71 
6.0 Introduction 71 
6.1 The Effect ofthe Independent Variables 71 
6.2 The Effect of the Moderating Variables 72 
6.3 Implications of Study 74 
6.4 Limitations of Study 76 
6.5 Suggestions for Future Research 77 
6.6 Conclusions 78 
• BIBLIOGRAPHY 79 
APPENDICES 83 
VI 
LIST OFT ABLES 
Page 
Table 5.1 Profile of respondents (AlA life insurance agents) 56 
Table 5.2 Cronbach ·s Alpha values for variables 57 
Table 5.3 Description of composite variables 57 
Table 5.4 t-test for Agent Status 58 ,_.. 
Table 5.5 Pearson Correlation values ( 1-tail) for all variables 59 
Table 5.6 Multiple Regression Analysis for Customer-oriented 
Selling Behavior and Social Values 60 
Table 5.7 Key Multiple Regression indicators (Perception of 
Type of Reward) 62 
Table 5.8 Performance at different levels of perception ofRecognition 
(Independent variable: Customer-oriented Selling Behavior) 63 
Table 5. 9 Performance at different levels of perception of Recognition 
(Independent variable: S~cial Values) 64 
Table 5.10 Performance at different levels of perception ofSymbols or 
Tokens (Independent variable: Customer-oriented Selling 
Behavior) 65 
Table 5.11 Key Multiple Regression indicators (Frequency of Receiving 
Rewards) 66 
Table 5.12 Performance at different levels of receiving of Recognhion 
(Independent variable: Customer-oriented Selling Behavior) 67 
Table 5.13 Performance at different levels of receiving of Symbols or 
Tokens (Independent variable: Customer-oriented Selling 
Behavior) 68 
Table 5.14 Performance at different levels of receiving Tangible Benefits 
(Independent variable: Customer-oriented Selling Behavior) 70 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 4.1 Research Framework 44 
Figure 5.1 Performance at different levels of perception of Recognition 
(Independent variable: Customer-oriented Selling Behavior) 63 
Figure 5.2 Performance at different levels of perception of Recognition 
(Independent variable: Social Values) 64 
Figure 5.3 Performance at different levels of perception of Symbols or 
Tokens (Independent variable: Customer-oriented Selling 
Behavior). 65 
Figure 5.4 Performance at different levels of receiving ofRecognition 
(Independent variable: Customer-oriented Selling Behavior) 68 
Figure 5.5 Performance at different levels of receiving of Symbols or 
Tokens (Independent variable: Customer-oriented Selling 
Behavior) 69 
Figure 5.6 Performance at different levels of receiving Tangible Benefits 
(Independent variable: Customer-oriented Selling Behavior) 70 
VII! 
LIS1 OF APPENDICES 
Page 
Appendix A: Questionnaires 
83 
:<· Appendix B: Reliability Analysis 
87 
i . Appendix C: Regression Analysis 93 
ix 
ABSTRAK 
Penyelidikan ini bertujuan untuk meninjau perhubungan di antara kelakuan jualan 
berorientasikan pelanggan dan nilai sosial terhadap prestasi ejen insuran nyawa. Soal 
selidik yang dibentuk oleh Saxe dan Weitz (1982), iaitu Skala SOCO digunakan 
untuk meninjau kelakuan jualan berorientasikan pelanggan, manakala List of Values 
(LOV) (Kahle, 1983) digunakan untuk meninjau nilai so sial. Analisis Regresi telah 
menunjukkan nilai sosial tidak memberi kesan ke atas peningkatan prestasi ejen. 
T eta pi kelakuan jualan 'beorientasikan pelanggan telah menunjukkan perhubungan 
positif dengan prestasi ejen. 
Penyelidikan ini juga menentukan sa rna ada ( 1) tanggapan jenis ganjaran yang diberi 
oleh syarikat insuran nyawa dan (2) kekerapan penerimaan jenis ganjaran oleh ejen; 
mempunyai sebarang kesan ke atas perhubungan tersebut. Secara keseluruhan, 
tanggapan jenis ganjaran yang diberi oleh syarikat insuran nyawa tidak memberi 
interaksi yang berkesan dengan perhubungan di atas. Tetapi kekerapan penerimaan 
sebarang jenis ganjaran olen ejen didapati mempunyai kesan tambahan ke atas 
perhubungan di antara kelakuan jualan berorientasikan pelanggan dengail prestasi. 
Keputusan di atas memberi implikasi kepada ejen insuran nyawa tempatan bahawa 
mereka mesti mempunyai kelakuan jualan berorientasikan pelanggan supaya prestasi 
mereka dapat ditngkatkan. Manakala, syarikat insuran nyawa di Malaysia mesti 
sentiasa mengadakan pelbagai jenis pertandingan supaya ejen-ejen mereka berpeluang 
menerima sebarang ganjaran yang diberi mereka kerana kekerapan menerima 
sebarang jenis ganjaran dapat meningkatkan prestasi ejen mereka ke tahap yang lebih 
tinggi. 
ABSTRACT 
This research seeks to examine the relationship between customer-oriented selling 
behavior and social values on the performance of life insurance agents. 
Questionnaires developed by Saxe and Weitz (1982), that is SOCO scale was used to 
examine customer-oriented selling behavior, while List of Values (LOV) (Kahle, 
1983) was used to examine social values. ~egression analysis shows that social values 
has no impact on the enhancement of performance of agents. But customer-oriented 
selling behavior has shown a positive relationship with the performance of agents. 
This research also determines whether ( 1) perception of type of reward given by the 
life insurers and (2) frequency of receiving rewards by the agents; have any impact on 
the relationship mentioned. As a whole, perception of type of reward given by life 
insurer has no interaction impact with the relationship mentioned above. But 
frequency of receiving any rewards by the agent has found to have an additional 
impact on the relationship between customer-oriented selling behavior with 
performance. 
The above results imply that the local life insurance agents must have customer-
oriented selling behavior in order to enhance their performance. While, life insurers in 
Malaysia must continually have various types of contest in order to enable their 
agents to have a chance to receive any rewards given by them because the frequency 
of receiving any rewards by the agents will boost the agents to a higher level of 
performance. 
Xl 
1.0 Introduction 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The life insurance concept was conceived as early as 2,800 BC when it was being 
applied by merchants to protect themselves against the loss of their property. The first 
life insurance contract recorded in England in 1583 on the life of William Gibbon. 
... . 
In fact the most important development in the life insurance business has been the 
introduction of the mortality table. The earliest mortality table was compiled in 1963 
by Hally. In the early years, the natural premium system was commonly used. Such a 
system gave rise to a few disadvantages both to the insurance companies and the 
policyholders. It was then decided to formulate a new method of calculating the 
premium rates. Hence. the level premium system was conceptualized and it began to 
be applied to the transaction of life insurance business in 1755 (Lee, 1987). 
With the passage of time, reliable mortality tables based on assured lives were 
obtained and mathematical techniques were developed to deal with life insurance on a 
scientific basis. This paved the way in 1762 for the Equitable Society to issue life 
insurance policies based on the following principles: 
• Cover was available to any one who satisfy the initial health requirements and 
continued to pay the contractual premiums; 
• Once accepted for insurance, further proof of continuing good health was not 
needed: 
• Level premiums were to be payabh~ throughout the term of the contract. these 
\Verc determined at entry according to the insured's age and the period for which 
the assurance was required: and 
• Extra premiums were chargeable for special occupational risks and sub-standard 
health risks. 
It is remarkable to note that many of these principles are still in use and a modem life 
insurance contract may be defined as one "which secures the payment of an agreed 
sum of money on the happening of a contingency, or of a variety of contingencies, 
dependent on a human life". 
1.1 Research Problem 
The performance of the Malaysian economy in 1998, as in the case with other East 
Asian economies. has been adversely affected by the deflationary impact of the 
financial crisis that besets the region since mid-1997. The erosion of financial wealth 
of the nation has been severe, as reflected by the sizeable loss of market capitalisation 
.. 
of the local bourse since the crisis started. All these developments have severe 
ramifications on the health of the economy and the socio-economic ·well-being of the 
population. 
The current economic slowdown also has affected the sale of new life business of all 
of the 18 life insurance companies in Malaysia. All categories of policies registered 
either negative or slower growth in new business premiums. Despite the unfavorable 
performance of new life policies sold in 1998. the demand for life insurance is still 
encouraging due to the continuous improvement of the standard living in the nation. 
Besides. the nation· s government policies also promotes national savings needed for 
economic development an.,.i more importantly the favorable tax breaks for life 
policyholders. 
However, the level of insurance penetration in Malaysia is still low when compared 
with countries like Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and the United States 
where the ratios are between 65% and 149%. Similarly, the premium income 
·4,· ,() 
generated by life insurers in Malaysia remained small in proportion to gross national 
savings. Therefore, there is a lot of untapped potential for insurers to increase their 
role in promoting savings through the premiums of life insurance coverage (Insurance 
Annual Report 1997). 
Today, a life insurance agent no longer specializes solely in increasing sales volume; 
rather, the prospect's real needs become the basis of the marketing plan. 
Companywide acceptance of a customer orientation requires the life insurance agent 
to become thoroughly professional in his or her dealings with prospects and 
customers. 
A mark of professionalism in sales is the sellers adopt a problem-solving approach to 
their work. A professional agent does not wonder, "What can I sell to this 
individual?" but instead asks, "How can I best solve this person's problem?''. 
Most successful agents in Malaysia are firmly in favour of the traditional insurance 
compensation consisting of large first year commissions, a stream of renewal 
commissions and various overrides and cash bonuses based on agency development, 
productivity and quality (persistency). 
.., 
Oth~r incentives and non-cash recognition and rewards also play an import1nt role in 
promoting a !if~ insurance agent business. The incentive travels, comprehensive 
training and development programs. tangible and intangible awards make a life 
insurance agent feel he or she has a lot of advantages that his or her friends and peers 
in other business do not enjoy. 
The decline in the new life businesses has directed life insurance compames m 
Malaysia to formulate strategies, such as offering various types of reward, to enhance 
their agents performance in 1998. Unfortunately, the results were still not encouraging 
which might be due to the type of reward offered were not attractive enough to their 
agents or were not suitable to the current economic situation. As a result, the expenses 
of the life insurance companies increased but their sales volume remain unchanged. 
Preparing for challenges in the next millenium is a process that should be vigorously 
pushed. It is a strategic shift that should not be linked to the short-term ups and downs 
of a business cycle. A pro-active approach on the part of insurers by way of strategic 
visions and directions in needed to achieve greater penetration and an enhanced 
market position. This would enable the insurers in Malaysia to be better prepared to 
face the increasingly competitive market environment. 
In view of the crucial and competitive market environment in life insurance industry, 
it is timely to carry out this research to study the relationship between a life insurance 
agent's customer oriented behavior, social values and type of reward given by a life 
insurance company in Malaysia on his or her performance. 
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The primary concern of this rl.!search is to examine the factors affecting American 
International Assurancl.! Company. Limited"s (AlA) life insurance agent performance. 
The two main questions for this research are: 
• How far that AlA agent's customer-oriented selling behavior and social values 
· affect his or her performance? 
• How far that the type of reward given by AlA play its role in influencing the 
relationships between agent's customer-oriented selling behavior and sociai"V~ues 
on his or her performance? (This study will examine the agent's perception 
towards different type of reward given by AlA and the frequency of an agent 
received such rewards). 
1.2 Research Objectives 
Specifically. the objectives ofthis study are to identify: 
I . The relationship between an agent" s customer-oriented selling behavior and social 
values on his or her performance. 
2. Whether the relationship in (I) is moderated by the perception of type of reward 
given by AlA. 
3. Whether the relationship in ( 1) is moderated by the frequency of receiving such 
rewards given by AlA. 
1.3 Significance of Study 
This study will offer AlA and other insurers in Malaysia with the knowledge of 
relationship between an agent's performance with his or her social values, customer-
oriented behavior and type of reward given by an insurer. It will also help to identify 
the appropriate type of reward that to enhance agent performance. 
5 
More importnntly. the outcome of this study will help the insurers Malaysia to focus 
only on the type of reward that really can help to improve the agent performance and 
hence, reduce the company's expenses on the unproductive reward and incentive 
program. 
If this study can show that there is a relationship between a life insurance agent's 
customer-oriented selling behavior and social values on the performance is moderated 
either by the perception ·of the type of reward given by an insurer or the frequency of 
receiving such rewards, then the insurer will be able to design their reward system to 
meet the specific needs ofthe agents, whilst maintaining company's performance. 
In addition, this study will also serve as guidelines to the insurers in Malaysia to 
enhance their agent performance towards professionalism based on the agents· 
personal values and behaviors. On the whole, this study will help to enhance the life 
insurance industry performance in Malaysia. 
1.4 Research Scope 
This study is to be carried out in all the AlA branches and offices in Perak Region. In 
this study, only agent's customer-oriented selling behavior, social values and the type 
of reward (perception and frequency) given by AlA are considered to have impact on 
the agent's performance. 
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Chapter 2 
LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY'-~ PROFILE OF AlA 
2.0 Historical Background of Insurance Business in Malaysia 
The insurance industry is a financial service industry involved in the business of 
providing individuals and organizations with protection against uncertainty of loss 
(risk) and return for a monetary consideration (premium). The protection given can be 
against loss of property, income or life (Poon & Zaman, 1993 ). 
The first rumblings of the insurance industry in Malaysia did not take place until the 
18th century. The insurance infancy was mainly based on the British system as it 
catered mainly to British trade and was managed by trading houses and agencies of 
British insurance companies. Local participation was negligible due to ignorance and 
lack of expertise. 
The 1950's witnessed a spiraling growth in the insurance industry. A substantial 
portion of the market was cornered by· British and American firms through locally 
incorporated companies. After independence in 1957, nationalistic s~ntiments resulted 
in moves to control the establishment of wholly-owned subsidiaries or branches of 
foreign companies which had previously been allowed a free rein. 
Given much encouragement, the domestic companies were poised to make further 
inroads in the market. However, the boom was marred by many companies which did 
not have sound underwriting practices. A number of companies went out of business 
leaving their policyholders high and dry. 
7 
The Govemmcnt stepped in to rt:mcdy the situation by introducing the Insurance Act 
1963. The office of the Director-General of Insurance (DGI). a division of the 
Ministry of Finance, was given the task of regulating and supervising the insurance 
industry. The Government also encouraged the insurance industry to project a 
Malaysian identity besides fulfilling its economic and social obligations. 
2.1 • An Overview of-the Insurance Industry 
The insurance industry ·in Malaysia experienced a rapid progress over the past I 0 
years. Total assets of the industry increased by more than five times to RM36.2 billion 
at the end of 1997 ( 1987: RM6.4 billion), while its paid-up capital increased by four 
times to RM2.7 billion (1987: RM679.3 million). The combined premium income of 
the life and general sectors increased more than five times to RMII.l billion (1987: 
RM2 billion). As a proportion of nominal gross national product (GNP), premium 
income increased to 4.2%. while total assets increased to 13.8% (1987: 8.6%) 
(Insurance Annual Report 1997). 
However, during the first half of 1998·: the insurance industry recorded a combined 
·-
premium income of RM5.2 billion, a slower increase of 3.4% compared to 19.3% in 
the corresponding period in 1997. The current economic slowdown has affected the 
sale of new life business that recorded negative growth in the first half of 1998. New 
business premiums and new sums insured decreased by 1.8% (January - June 1997: 
-'-21.4%) and 18.1% (January- June 1997: +31.1 %) respectively to RM0.7 billion and 
R..\1144.6 billion. Despite the unfavorable performance of new businesses, annual 
premiums in force and total sums insured in force increased by 15.1% and 17.45% 
(January- June 1997: 13.4% and 12.2%) respectively (Economic Report 1998/99). 
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2.2 Princip~1l-Agcnt Relationship 
Standard agency theory tells us that optimal incentive schemes make use of all 
available information related to the life insurance agent performance. In agency 
theory. the firm is viewed as a "nexus of contracts .. among self-interested individuals 
rather as a unified, profit-maximizing entity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Principal 
employ "agents .. to perform work on his or her behalf and delesates some decision-
making authority to the agent. 
In short. an agent is a person authorized to represent and act on behalf of the principal. 
Contracts entered into by an agent with a third party are enforceable, in the same 
manner and have similar legal consequences, as if the contracts were entered into by 
the principal. However. agents need constant supervision and management because 
they otherwise w·ill tend to pursue their own interest rather than those of the 
principals. 
Hart and Holmstrom·( 1987) see in this sufficient statistical result ''the main predictive 
content of the basic agency model" and conclude that ''agency relationship create a 
demand for monitoring". Principals have an interest in monitoring, since it creates 
information about the agent's behavior. Tirole (1986), however, notes that if a third 
party (the supervisor) performs the monitoring then new problems can arise. The 
supervisor has his own interest and these may be in conflict with the principal's. 
Strausz (1997) has analyzed a principal-agent model with the possibility of 
monitoring. He has shown that delegation of monitoring is profitable. Delegation is 
beneficial for two reasons. First, when monitoring is not contractible, the principal 
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must creat~ incentives to induce both monitoring and effort. So. with delegation. the 
principal can bener regulate incentives (incentive-effect). 
A second beneficial effect of delegation is due to an increased possibility of 
commitment. If the evidence obtained by monitoring is private information and can be 
concealed, then the principal cannot make rewards to the agent dependent on the 
monitoring signal. In this case, the pri.Q.c,i.val will not reveal_ information that forces her 
to reward the agent. When the principal employs a supervisor then such rewards can 
be made credible and commitment to rewarding the agent is possible. This creates the 
·commitment-effect of delegation. 
Basically, there are two distinct kinds of problems faced by a principal m life 
insurance business when entering a relationship with an agent. First, precontractual 
problems arise before the principal decides to offer an agent a contract. The major 
issues here are whether a particular agent has the characteristics the principal is 
seeking and what strategy the principal should employ to find out. These are the kinds 
. . 
of problems the life insurers' marketers face when recruiting new agents. 
Second, postcontractual problems emerge after the principal and agent engages in a 
relationship. The major issues here are how the life in~urers should evaluate and 
reward the agent's performance so he or he will be motivated to behave in a manner 
consistent with the insurers' goals and what information strategy should be employed 
to make such evaluations. Insurers' marketers commonly face such problems when 
designing compensation and incentive programs for agents (Bergen, Dutta and 
Walker, 1992). 
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2.3 Insurance Legislation 
2. 3. I The Insurance Act 1996 
The Insurance Act 1963 ( 1963 Act) and the Life Assurance Companies (Compulsory 
Liquidation Act 1962) ( 1962 Act) were repealed on I January 1997 and the Insurance 
Act 1996 (1996 Act) was passed by Parliament during its July 1996 session. It 
received Royal Assent in September 1996 and was gazetted as Act 553 in the same 
month. The 1996 Act was brou~ht into force on l January 1997. 
As the number of insurers venturing abroad had increased and was expected to 
increase further. and since any adverse results from overseas operations would have 
an impact on the overall financial health of the insurer, the scope of the 1996 Act has 
been extended to cover the entire business of the insurer. 
In general. the regulatory regime governing the operations of the insurance industry 
has been tightened. The re-regulation is made with the purpose of putting the 
insurance industry on a sounder footing and preparing it to compete effectively in the 
local and international arena, as trade barriers are progressively dismantled. Towards 
this end. the 1996 Act has shifted some of the supervisory responsibilities from Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM) to the management and the board of directors, the external 
auditors as well as the appointed actuary. Notwithstanding that, BNM will c~ntinue to 
put into place policy initiatives to develop the insurance sector into a key component 
of the fmancial services sector (Insurance Annual Report 1996). 
2.3.2 Section -1-IA and Section 16A 
A life insurance agent in Malavsia is governed bv the two Sections of the Insurance 
- ~ - -
.-\ct: 
ll 
fi)Secrion -1-IA. 
(I J A person 1rho has. at any time. been authori=ed as its agents by an insurer and 
1rho solicits or negotiates a contract of insurance in such capacity shall in every such 
instance be deemed for the purpose of the formation of the contract to be the agent of 
the insurer and the knowledge of such person relating to any matter relevant to the 
acceptance of 1he risk by the insurer shall be deemed to be the knowledge of the 
insurer. 
(]) Any statement made or any act done by any such person in his representative 
capacity shall be deemed, for the purpose of the formation of the contract, to be a 
statement made or done by the insurer notwithstanding ant contravention of Section 
1 6A or any other provision of this Act by such person. 
(iiJSection I 6A 
Any person who. by any statement, promise or forecast which he knows to be 
misleading, false or deceptive, or by an_v ji-audulent concealment of material fact or 
by the reckless making (ji·audulent or otherwise or any statement promise to forecast 
which is misleading, false or deceptive induces or attempts to induce another person 
to enter into or offer to enter into any contract of insurance with an insurer shall be 
guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding twenty 
thousand ringgit or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or both 
The scope of power may seem wide, however, the agent can act only within the 
authority granted to him by the principaL A life insurance agent is one who is 
appointed for the purpose of procuring and transmitting to the insurance company 
12 
applications for life insurance and performing other duties as may be required by the 
insurance company and for no other purpose. 
An agent has no authority to make, alter or discharge a life policy or other c~ntract; to 
incur liability on behalf of the company; to deliver any policy until the first premium 
is paid in full; to deliver any other contract until the required consideration is paid in 
full except by the express consent of the company. · 
..... 
2.4 Compensation for Life Insurance Agents 
There is a close parallel between life insurance selling and athletics, particularly 
football. In life insurance selling, as in football, the agents are going to get knocked 
down. Ifs one of the most rewarding games in the world and, it's also one of the 
toughest games: they are bound to have setbacks. There are no substitutes in this 
game: this is the game of life and the agents must play every play the whole game 
long. Winning is the name of this game, but commission dollars is how the agents 
keep score. 
One of the greatest things in the life insurance business is that nothing worthwhile 
comes without hard work, and hard work is just like getting into shape - once the 
agents get used to it, it's easy. Hustle and hard work will make up for a lot of mistakes 
and shortcomings. Probably the strongest motivating factor that will affect the 
performance for the insurance agents is the pressure of goals and deadlines. In 
addition. the compensation given by the principal also has repeatedly inspired the 
agents. 
1:; 
Lift: insurance agents also find thcm&clves in a business environment characterized by 
increasing consumer awareness. keen competition within the industry. substantial 
competition from other financial institutions for the consumers· dollars. inflation and 
fluctuating interest rates. All these factors have made the selling job more difficult. 
Earnings of agents normally take the form of high first year compensation and low 
renewal compensation. This pattern of compensation recognizes both the substantial 
efforts involved in closing a sale and the servicing efforts involved in keeping the 
policy in force. 
Agents· compensation schedules should direct agents· attention to key corporate 
objectives. That is, the sale of one kind of policy versus another is often influenced by 
the compensation level on each: either a particular product pays a high commission 
and therefore be attractive to the agent or it pays a low commission and may therefore 
be attractive to the consumer because of lower cost (and easier to sell). 
The lure of the insurance sales and management career is largely conceptual. Put 
simply, it is the ability to control one's lot in life. The most successful agents report 
that the ability to run their own business was most important. To decide when to 
work, how to work, with whom to work, to determine and control their own 
compensation and develop a very high self-esteem are the most frequently cited 
factors. Also very important is the role the agent plays in a family or business and it is 
widely reckoned that to become agents is like becoming "entrepreneurs" without a 
cash capital injection. 
1..1 
On the w~10lc. when developing or modifying any compensation system, it IS 
important to measure the correct factors. In a number of cases. there is little 
co1Telation between first-year commissions and the expected economic contributions 
of the new business sold. Compensation, although a powerful tool, is an expensive 
and unsustainable means of creating competitive advantage in attracting and retaining 
productive agents. It is important to develop other means to constructively tie agents 
to a company while enhancing productivity (Berry 1996). 
2.5 Profile of AlA 
2.5.1 A Brief Hist01y of AlA 
A.I.A, a multi-line insurance company, is a wholly owned subsidiary of American 
International group. Inc. (AIG), New York. Founded by the late Cornelius Vander 
Starr. AIA. then named INTASCO (International Assurance Company, Limited), was 
incorporated in Hong Kong and began operations in Shanghai on April 14, 1931, 
followed by rapid expansion throughout the South East Asian region. Thus, it has 
served the Asian region for over 65 years. 
When the Japanese occupied Shanghai at the beginning of World War II, the 
company's business operations were disrupted and its offices in South East Asia were 
shut down until after the war. When fighting ended in 1945, lNTASCO was ready to 
go back into business in Shanghai, less than two weeks after the Japanese surrender. 
In 194 7, the regional headquarters was transferred to Hong Kong. A year later, 
INT ASCO changed its name to American International Assurance Company, Limited. 
Today, AlA has branch offices and affiliated companies in Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
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Macau. Tai\'lan. The Philippines. Korea. Malaysia. Singapore. Thailand, Brun~i. 
Indonesia. Australia. Japan. New Zealand and Guam. 
At present, AlA is an industry leader in Asia, marketing life and general insurance 
products and financial services through an extensive agency force of nearly l 0,000 
agents. Recently, AlA received the highest possible claims paying ability rating -
·~ AAA- by Standard & Poor's, one of the world leading rating agencies. The top-flight 
ratings reflected AlA's ·superior management operating control, a strong financial 
profile. excellent liquidity and earnings. AlA has become the only Asian-based life 
insurance company to be accorded AAA credit status. 
7 - 7 
_,),_ Background of AlA Mala,vsia 
AlA began operations in Malaysia (then Malaya) in 1948, in Kuala Lumpur, Penang, 
Ipoh. Sandakan and Kuching. Business continued to grow in the 1950s and AlA 
opened new branch offices in Melaka in 1951, Kota Bharu in 1953 and Bukit 
Mertajam in 1956. 
Business expansion in the 1960s led to the establishment of branches in Alor Star, 
Seremban, Kota Kinabalu, Kulim, Kuantan, Johor Bahru and Taiping. In the 1970s, 
continued success in the region prompted AlA to expand to Batu Pahat, Tawau, Sibu, 
Sungai Petani, Miri and Kluang. 
Today, AlA has a network of 22 branches throughout the nation, with 19 housed in its 
own buildings. After four decades of operations in Malaysia, AlA has evolved into an 
advanced organization. keeping pace with the changes of time. Through a 
comprehensive automation program and a decentralized program implemented during 
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the late 80s. AlA has blended the sophistication of modern computer technology with 
the traditional human touch. which has always been so much a part of its 
policyholders service. 
True to its leader's role, AlA is the first life insurance company in Malaysia to have 
fully computerized policyholders service and policy administrative systems. 1998 will 
,Q -
mark a new chapter in its history, with the construction of twin towers to even better 
serve agents and policyhblders. 
2.5.3 AlA Agency Management 
AlA is an agency company, recruiting and training its own agents and going out and 
soliciting its own business. The sales organization is organized into three levels with 
the district manger at the top. then the unit manager and finally but most importantly, 
the agents. 
In AlA, an agency is only a professional as the people who make up the agency. A 
professional agency is made up of people who· are proud to be professionals. Such 
people know that professional development - continuous training and advance 
education through courses and seminars - is the price an AlA agent pays to become 
and remain a professional. Agencies with strong, professional cultures are made up of 
such agents. The involvement of AlA district and unit managers (agency leaders) in 
continuing education serves as a notice of what is expected among their agents. 
AlA· s life insurance agents came under the direct supervision of agency leaders who 
t)rpically were promoted among the better agents. The leaders, like the ordinary 
agents. were non-salaried and they were paid commissions on policies they personally 
sold as well as a percentage of the commissions credited to the agents under their 
charge. In addition to selling, the leaders were also responsible for helping to recruit 
and train new agents. 
Sales force turnover at AlA is quite high. especially among the new agents. In fact, 
turnover among life insurance agents was a common problem faced by all the life 
i-nsurance companies in Malaysia. But, the turnover rate for the more experienced 
agents was lower primarily because of the residual compensation structure built into 
the industry. AlA also faced difficulty in recruiting agents. In the opinion of the 
public, most of the people prefer jobs offering a more stable form of income. 
2.5.-1 The Role of an AlA Life Insurance Agent 
The role of an AlA life insurance agent is to: 
(I) bring financial relief to aggrieved dependents of insured people who may meet 
with an untimely death; 
(2) inculcate the discipline of savings amqngst the working population, and 
(3) provide other forms of insurance related services to the public. 
In short, to be an effective life insurance agent, one should be able to. recognize the 
insurance needs of the customers. The customers should be sold the right type of 
products so that it meets their insuring needs and the policy is not lapsed. The agents 
are expected to provide, in a sense the best possible advice to the customers. 
") - -
__ ::>.::> TJpe of Re·ward in AlA 
Besides the basic first year and rene\val commiSSions given to the life insurance 
agents. AlA usually will throw various types of contests to enhance its agents 
performance. The period of the contests ranges from a minimum of one month up to a 
maximum of two years. From the past records. it seems some of the contests were 
very attractive and hence boost the agent performance, and some were not. 
Basically, there are three types of reward: recognition, symbols or tokens and tangible 
benefits (Cook, 1998). The tangible or intangible incentives in AlA that can be put 
under each type of reward as follows: 
(I) Recognition 
• Special individual recognition at AlA annual dinner (e.g.. Perak & National 
Annual Dinner & Award Presentation Nite) .. 
• Personal name in print stationery (e.g .. Free persona/letterhead & envelope with 
name in print). 
• Top producer of the month/year (e.g .. Display top producer's photographs in AlA 
bulletin. poster and office). 
(2) Symbols or Tokens 
• AIA various Clubs Memberships (e.g.. Producer Club, MDC (Asst. Business 
Development it1anager) & SSC (Senior Business Development manager)). 
--
• Free insurance package (e.g., Free group term life, hospitalization and surgical 
coverage). 
• Free training & development program (e.g., Free MII-LUTC Courses & LOMA 
program). 
(3) Tangible Benefits 
• Incentive trip cum AlA convention fe.g .. Bangkok Pacesetter Convention & 1999 
London & Porwgal Summit Convention). 
• AlA special bonus and cash incentive re.g., 1999 New Year Bonus contest). 
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• AlA special gift (e.g.. Watch. notebook. TV & camera}. 
~0 
3.0 Introduction 
Chapter 3 
LITERATURE REVIE\V 
Past reviews of the salesperson performance literature have not provided an adequate 
explanation for the observed inconsistencies. Part of the problem is that some of the 
reviews have been narrative. Though a narrative review affords the opportunity for 
special insight about the classification of phenomena and limitations of the studies, it 
is not the most effective way of generating a consistent summary result. 
In reviewing the literature, this chapter will concentrate on the defmitions and 
dimensions of individual job performance. In addition, the factors influence job 
perforniance will also be reviewed. 
3. I Individual Job Performance 
3.1.1 Definition of Individual Job Pe1jormance 
Job performance is the most widely studied criterion variable in the organizational 
behavior and human resource management literatures. The construct. is perhaps even 
more important in a sales context, given that salesperson performance often directly 
results in revenue for the firm. 
Performance is defmed by the outcomes of behavior. Behavior is individual activity, 
whereas the outcomes of the behavior are the ways in which the behaving individual's 
environment is somehow different as a result of his or her behavior (Nickols, 1977). 
The concept of outcomes is similar to the concept of ··accomplishment" described by 
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Thomas F.G. in Le,·e/s and Structure of Pe1jormance Anaf.,·sis ( 1974) and to the 
concept of .. achicvemcnts .. described by Gilbe11 R. in The Concept ofARnd ( 1949). 
Perfom1ance, then, is the achievement of some condition that reflects one or more 
outcomes of the behavior of one or more individuals. To illustrate these points, let's 
analyze the following behavioral objective, taken from Robert F. Mager's Preparing 
Instructional Objectives (1962, p.59): 
"Given the proper(rfzmctioning audiometer of any model. the student 
must be able to make the adjustments and control settings necessary 
prior to the conduct of a standard test. " 
The behavior described in this objective may be conveniently termed as "adjusting .. 
behavior. whereas the outcomes of this adjusting behavior are reflected in the state of 
the audiometer, namely, controls that are set and adjusted. The performance implied 
in this objective is also reflected by tl)e audiometer, that is, when the student 
completes his or· her activity, the audiometer is to be in a condition suitable for 
conducting a standard hearing test. 
The measure of performance for this objective is the extent to which the audiometer is 
or is not in that condition upon completion of student activity. From the presumably 
verifiable condition of the audiometer, it is reasonable to infer that the proper 
·'adjusting'· behavior did or did not occur. 
The preceding analysis of a behavioral objective illustrates Nickols ( 1977) central 
point: Performance is (or ought to be) defined more by the outcomes of behavior than 
by the behavior itself. It follows, therefore. that the development of performance 
standards should be based on an examination of the outcomes of behavior instead of 
the behavior that is thought to lead to those outcomes. As Gilbett ( 1974, p.l3) wrote, 
.. If you think about it, then, it is only the accomplishments of performance that we 
value - never the behavior that produce them ... 
3.1.2 Dimensions of Individual Job~eJformance 
The "appropriate'' way. to measure performance IS a dispute that lingers in the 
literature. Some authors argue that much evidence about individual job performance is 
flawed because it relies on self-report measures which may have an upward bias. 
Others believe that self-report measures are fine because even ifthey are biased there 
is no reason to suspect the amount of bias varies systematically across salespeople. 
In a study to assess the determinants of salesperson performance, Churchill et al. 
( 1 985) used four types of performance dimensions to investigate whether the results 
depend on the types of performance dimensions used. They are ( 1) self-report 
performance, (2) manager and peer ratings, (3) objective company data, and (4) 
objective company data with control for externalities. The distinction between the two 
types of objective data used is consistent with the conceptual separation of 
"performance·· and "effectiveness", as discussed by Walker et al. (1979). 
The objective company data that control for externalities include such items as sales 
as a percentage of quota or market potentiaL sales corrected for economic conditions. 
or the salesperson's route difficulty. Objective company data that are not corrected for 
externalities include such items as total sales volume, expenses, number of total caiis 
or new· account calls. or the number of demonstrations. Some of these measures 
rdlect salesperson inputs (e.g .. number of calls) and some retlect,outputs (e.g., sales). 
The general conclusion that emerges from this study is that there is no basis for 
generalizations that higher correlation can be expected when particular types of 
performance dimensions are used as criteria. 
Production is the ratio or relationship between input and outputs. Its measures also has 
been used to monitor the job performance of an organization or individuals. If used as 
targets which are linked to rewards, the form of measures used will influence 
perfom1ance. The objective of productivity measurement must be to help an 
organization or individual become more successful at whatever it is doing. (Hope & 
Muhlemann. 1997) 
Productivity measures. when used to monitor performance, can signal both positive 
and negative changes in agent performance. When performance deteriorates, further 
analysis is required to understand why. The factor identified as being responsible for 
the deterioration, appropriate action should be taken to remedy the situations. 
Gummesson ( 19?3) points out that cultural factors will influence productivity. He 
suggests that when the customer is involved in the process, the same behavior may be 
transferable to the reading of signs and instructions within the service operation. 
Morris and Davis (1992) analyzed the performance of a number of firms and found 
that those with a customer service focus such as life insurance business has higher 
sales growth rates and increased profits. Thus, a critical success factor (CSF) could be 
customer focus. It is only CSFs have been identified can performance measures be 
designed. 
